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Abstract
Recent empirics suggest the relevance of transport cost reductions
for world trade growth along with eliminations in protectionist trade
barriers. To address the welfare effects of trade cost reductions in a
context of ‘trade and the environment,’ we develop a two-stage game
model where governments choose environmental and trade policies and
firms play a Cournot-Nash game. We show that reductions in trans-
port costs lead to lower emission taxes and higher tariffs. And, we find
that the degree of pollution damage plays a central role in whether
market integration is welfare-improving relative to autarky.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decades, multilateral market integration has led to rapid growth
in world trade. While it is obvious that such growth in world trade has
improved welfare of each country and the world, it simultaneously brings
new concerns, e.g., protection of intellectual property rights, and trade and
labor standard.1
Among others, ‘trade and the environment’ has received much atten-
tion in both international and environmental economics, which has brought
a large literature.2 One of the central interests in this field is what conse-
quences follow from a noncooperative setting of environmental policies. Early
contributions include Conrad (1993), Kennedy (1994a,b), Rauscher (1994),
Ulph (1996) and Tanguay (2001), wherein each country is motivated to use
laxer environmental policies as a tacit protectionist trade policy called ‘eco-
dumping.’ In contrast, a Bertrand-Nash model of Barrett (1994, Section 5)
shows that the noncooperatively determined environmental policy is tougher
than the environmentally optimal level. Based on the above body of liter-
ature, Walz and Wellisch (1997), Burguet and Sempere (2003), and Baksi
and Chaudhuri (2009) consider welfare effects of trade liberalization, i.e.,
multilateral reductions in protectionist trade policies, under noncooperative
choices of environmental policies.3
On the driving forces of growing world trade flows, Baier and Bergstrand
(2001, p. 19) empirically show that ‘income growth, tariff rate reductions,
and transport-cost declines all contributed nontrivially to the real growth
of world trade.’4 Despite these evidences, to our knowledge, there is no
study except for Straume (2006) that addresses the effects of transport cost
reductions.5 Straume (2006) examines the effects of transport cost reductions
in a two-stage game model in which governments choose emission taxes and
then oligopolistic firms choose output and abatement levels, taking the taxes
as given. One of his novel results is that market integration can reduce the
need for inter-country policy coordination.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a two-country, two-stage game
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model to consider the impact of market integration, i.e., transport cost re-
ductions, on the optimal tariff and emission tax, and welfare. While we are
partly common with Straume (2006) in interests, this paper is greatly differ-
entiated. First, we allow for not only emission taxes but also tariffs as policy
instruments.6 Second, we pay much attention to welfare effects of market
integration whereas Straume’s (2006) aim is to analyze policy coordination.
We establish two main results. First, market integration leads each country
to impose a laxer environmental policy (lower emission tax) and a tougher
trade policy (higher tariff). Second, we find three patterns of the depen-
dence of the Nash equilibrium welfare on trade costs. Whether freer trade is
beneficial highly depends on the degree of pollution damage.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates a
two-stage game model in which the government in two trading countries
noncooperatively chooses emission taxes and tariffs in the first stage and firms
play a Cournot-Nash game in the second stage. The subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium is characterized. Section 3 explores welfare effects of transport
cost reductions. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 A Model
2.1 FUNDAMENTALS
Consider a reciprocal market model of intra-industry trade in homogeneous
goods.7 There are two symmetric countries (Home and Foreign), two goods
(Goods 1 and 2) and one factor (labor). The Foreign variables are asterisked
to distinguish them from the Home variables. The market of Good 1 in each
country is segmented and duopolized by a Home firm (firm X) and a Foreign
firm (firm Y). Without loss of generality, one unit of labor produces one unit
of Good 2, which is the numareire, so that the wage rate is internationally
fixed to unity. Production of Good 1 is nationally monopolized under a
constant marginal cost c ≥ 0, and emits a proportional emission, which is
transboundary. Letting x (resp. y) and x∗ (resp. y∗) be the Home (resp.
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Foreign) firm’s supply into the Home and Foreign markets, pollution in Home
is measured by x + x∗ + θ(y + y∗) where θ ∈ [0, 1] is a fraction of Foreign
emission arriving in Home.8 Analogously, pollution in Foreign is θ(x+ x∗) +
y + y∗.
Assume a representative consumer in each country whose preference is
u = aC1 − C
2
1
2
+ C2 − sZ, a > c, s > 0, (1)
where u is utility, Ci, i = 1, 2 is the consumption of Goods 1 and 2, and s
is marginal damage from pollution.9 Utility maximization under the budget
constraint yields linear inverse demand functions: p = a − x − y and p∗ =
a− x∗ − y∗.
Two policy instruments are available to each country’s government: emis-
sion taxes τ and τ ∗ and import tariffs t and t∗. Moreover, we assume that
exporting involves a per-unit transport cost T ≥ 0. While transportation
involves a certain pollutant as Colvile et al. (2001) empirically argue, we do
not model it throughout our analysis. Summarizing these assumptions, the
profit of the Home and Foreign firms is defined by
Home firm : (a− c− τ − x− y)x+ (a− c− τ − t∗ − T − x∗ − y∗)x∗ (2)
Foreign firm : (a− c− τ ∗ − t− T − x− y)y + (a− c− τ ∗ − x∗ − y∗)y∗,
(3)
where the first term in these equations represents the profit from serving
in the Home market and the second term is the counterpart in the Foreign
market.10
Let us consider the following two-stage game. The Home and Foreign
governments choose emission taxes and tariffs to maximize welfare in the
first stage. Taking these policy choices as given, the Home and Foreign firms
play a Cournot-Nash game in the second stage. We will solve this game with
backward induction.
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2.2 A COURNOT-NASH GAME
This subsection solves the second stage of the game: a quantity-setting game.
Solving the system of the first-order conditions for profit maximization yields
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs:11
x =
a− c− 2τ + τ ∗ + t+ T
3
(4)
x∗ =
a− c− 2τ + τ ∗ − 2t∗ − 2T
3
(5)
y =
a− c+ τ − 2τ ∗ − 2t− 2T
3
(6)
y∗ =
a− c+ τ − 2τ ∗ + t∗ + T
3
. (7)
Making use of (4)-(7), consumer surplus in Home denoted by CS (resp.
Foreign denoted by CS∗) is given by CS = (x + y)2/2 (resp. CS∗ = (x∗ +
y∗)2/2) and the equilibrium profit of each firm, denoted by pi and pi∗, is simply
expressed by pi = x2 + x∗2 and pi∗ = y2 + y∗2, respectively. Assuming that
the Home government distributes the emission tax revenue τ(x+x∗) and the
tariff revenue ty to the consumer in a lump-sum fashion, Home’s welfare to
be maximized in the first stage is defined as follows.
V = CS + pi + τ(x+ x∗) + ty − sZ
=
(x+ y)2
2
+ x2 + x∗2 + τ(x+ x∗) + ty − s [x+ x∗ + θ(y + y∗)]
=
1
2
[
2(a− c)− τ − τ ∗ − t− T
3
]2
+
(
a− c− 2τ + τ ∗ + t+ T
3
)2
+
(
a− c− 2τ + τ ∗ − 2t∗ − 2T
3
)2
+τ · [2(a− c)− 4τ + 2τ
∗ + t− 2t∗ − T ]
3
+ t · (a− c+ τ − 2τ
∗ − 2t− 2T )
3
−s · [2(a− c)− 4τ + 2τ
∗ + t− 2t∗ − T ] + θ [2(a− c) + 2τ − 4τ ∗ − 2t+ t∗ − T ]
3
≡ V (τ, τ ∗, t, t∗, T ). (8)
Applying the same procedure to Foreign, the Foreign government’s payoff is
defined by V (τ ∗, τ, t∗, t, T ) due to the symmetry assumption between coun-
tries.
5
2.3 A POLICY GAME
Having derived the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the second stage, let us
turn to the first stage and derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Each government seeks to maximize welfare by choosing emission taxes and
tariffs. Then, the first-order conditions are
∂V
∂τ
=
−7τ − τ ∗ + 3t+ 2t∗ + 2T − 4(a− c) + 6s(2− θ)
9
= 0
∂V
∂t
=
τ − τ ∗ − 3t− T + a− c− s(1− 2θ)
3
= 0
∂V ∗
∂τ ∗
=
−τ − 7τ ∗ + 2t+ 3t∗ + 2T − 4(a− c) + 6s(2− θ)
9
= 0
∂V ∗
∂t∗
=
−τ + τ ∗ − 3t∗ − T + a− c− s(1− 2θ)
3
= 0.
These conditions allow us to find that both governments choose the same
level of emission taxes and tariffs, each of which is explicitly derived as
τN =
−7(a− c) + T + s(31− 8θ)
24
(9)
tN =
a− c− T − s(1− 2θ)
3
, (10)
where superscript N refers to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Substi-
tuting these into (4)-(7) and using the definition of pollution, the domestic
emission (the total supply of a firm) and the pollution level in each country
are
emission = x+ x∗ = y + y∗ =
3(a− c− s)− T
4
pollution = x+ x∗ + θ(y + y∗) = θ(x+ x∗) + y + y∗ =
(1 + θ)[3(a− c− s)− T ]
4
.
Thus, the degree of transboundary pollution θ has no impact on the individ-
ual firm’s emission and a positive impact on pollution in each country.
Eqs. (9) and (10) immediately lead to:
Proposition 1. Market integration, i.e., a reduction in transport costs,
lowers the emission tax and raises the tariff determined in the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
6
(Table 1 around here)
Employing Straume’s (2006) decomposition, let us consider the intuitions
behind Proposition 1. As shown in Appendix and Table 1 in detail, the ef-
fect of a change in transport costs on consumer utility is UτT = UtT = −1/9.
These negative signs imply that transport cost reductions increase each coun-
try’s marginal benefit from taxation and thus higher taxes are chosen. The
reason is simply that reduced transport costs promote competition and thus
the distortion associated with under-supply becomes weaker, namely, there
is less need to under-tax to tackle the under-supply problem.
The second welfare component is considered by examining the effect on
net trade surplus, Sτ and St. Appendix shows that SτT > 0 and StT < 0,
which, in turn, implies that market integration strengthens (resp. weakens)
the rent-shifting motive through an emission tax (resp. a tariff). As Straume
(2006, p. 544) states, ‘lower trade costs make it easier to capture rents from
the foreign market.’ Therefore, each government chooses a lower emission
tax and a higher tariff so as to shift more rents from the trading country.
The third and fourth components relate to the effects on production costs
and damages from pollution. As is inferred from the linear specification of
production cost and pollution damage, there is no effect of transport cost
reductions on these terms, i.e., CτT = CtT = DτT = DtT = 0. In other
words, ‘only incentives for rent-shifting and increasing consumer utility are
affected.’ (Straume, 2006, p. 544)
The total effect of reduced transport costs on the equilibrium emission tax
and tariff is determined by the above effects. If transport cost reductions fa-
vorably affect the change in marginal benefit from emission taxes and tariffs,
governments will raise these taxes. As Table 1 summarizes, since the positive
effect on net trade surplus outweighs the negative effect on consumer util-
ity, the total effect becomes positive and hence market integration induces a
higher emission tax. In contrast, both the effect on consumer utility and net
trade surplus are negative in the case of tariffs. Consequently, the total effect
also becomes negative and a lower tariff is induced by market integration.
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Before proceeding, let us mention the difference between Burguet and
Sempere (2003) and us regarding the response of the optimal emission tax
to reductions in trade barrier. Burguet and Sempere (2003, p. 35) find
that ‘environmental policies are tougher after the reduction in tariffs,’ which
is seemingly contradictive to our result. This discrepancy stems from the
difference in the assumption on trade barriers. Because Burguet and Sempere
(2003) assume an import tariff as an exogenous trade barrier, governments
have an incentive to compensate for reduced tariff revenue by raising emission
taxes. On the other hand, such a motive does not exist in our model since
we have assumed that an exogenous trade barrier takes a form of transport
costs.
3 Gains/Losses from Trade
This section considers the relationship between the welfare level determined
in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and transport costs. To this end, we
need to compute a prohibitive trade cost over which exports are zero and the
resulting equilibrium coincides with the autarkic equilibrium. Substituting
(9) and (10) into either (5) or (6), each firm’s export becomes
x∗ = y =
5(a− c)− 11T − s(5 + 8θ)
24
.
Thus, setting this to zero, the prohibitive transport cost T is
T =
5(a− c)− s(5 + 8θ)
11
. (11)
From an economic point of view, this must be non-negative and thus we need
a restriction that s ≤ 5(a− c)/(5 + 8θ).
Let us next compute the welfare level in the subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium. Substituting (9) and (10) into (8) and rearranging terms yield
W (T ) ≡ V
(
τN , τN , tN , tN , T
)
=
41T 2 − 2[13(a− c)− s(13 + 28θ)]T + 9(a− c− s)[5(a− c)− s(5 + 8θ)]
96
.
(12)
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The rest of our task is to closely examine the properties of W (T ). Our
finding is summarized in:
Proposition 2. There are three possibilities on the locus of W (T ) depending
on s. They are classified as follows.
Case 1 (Figure 1) with s < 9(a−c)
9+32θ
: W (0) > W
(
T
)
,W ′(0) < 0, and W ′
(
T
)
>
0
Case 2 (Figure 2) with 9(a−c)
9+32θ
< s < 13(a−c)
13+28θ
: W (0) < W
(
T
)
,W ′(0) <
0, and W ′
(
T
)
> 0
Case 3 (Figure 3) with s > 5(a−c)
5+8θ
: W (0) < W
(
T
)
,W ′(0) > 0, and W ′
(
T
)
>
0.
(Figures 1-4 around here)
Proof: We begin by comparing the welfare levels at zero transport cost and
the prohibitive transport cost. Evaluating (12) at T = 0 and T = T , welfare
in these two polar cases is respectively
W (0) =
3(a− c− s)[5(a− c)− s(5 + 8θ)]
32
W
(
T
)
=
3[5(a− c)− s(5 + 8θ)][7(a− c) + s(2θ − 7)]
242
.
Taking the ratio between these two, we have
W (0)
W
(
T
) = 121(a− c− s)
16[7(a− c) + s(2θ − 7)] ,
which exceeds one if and only if s < 9(a−c)/(9+32θ). That is, if the damage
from pollution is small enough, welfare at zero transport cost is higher than
that at the prohibitive transport cost, i.e., welfare under autarky.
The next task is to compute the slope of W (T ). Differentiating (12) once
and twice yields
W ′(T ) =
41T − [13(a− c)− s(13 + 28θ)]
48
, W ′′(T ) =
41
48
. (13)
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At this stage, we easily see that the locus of W (T ) is strictly convex since
the second derivative is positive. Evaluating W ′(T ) at T = 0 and T = T , we
obtain
W ′(0) =
−13(a− c) + s(13 + 28θ)
48
(14)
W ′
(
T
)
=
31(a− c)− s(31 + 10θ)
264
. (15)
Accordingly, we see that W ′(0) < 0 if and only if s < 13(a − c)/(13 + 28θ)
and that W ′
(
T
)
> 0 if and only if s < 31(a− c)/(31 + 10θ).
However, the upper bound of s should be replaced from 31(a− c)/(31 +
10θ) to 5(a− c)/(5 + 8θ) because of the restriction that T ≥ 0 made above.
Therefore, the three thresholds that determine three inequalities in Proposi-
tion 2 have a unique ranking such that
5(a− c)
5 + 8θ
>
13(a− c)
13 + 28θ
>
9(a− c)
9 + 32θ
.
This ranking is depicted in Figure 4. Based on it, we can divide three possi-
bilities as follows. First, if s < 9(a − c)/(9 + 32θ), we have W (0) > W (T ),
W ′(0) < 0 and W ′
(
T
)
> 0, which gives Figure 1. Second, if s falls between
9(a − c)/(9 + 32θ) and 13(a − c)/(13 + 28θ), W (0) < W
(
T
)
, W ′(0) < 0
and W ′
(
T
)
> 0 follow, from which we can get Figure 2. Finally, we have
W (0) < W
(
T
)
, W ′(0) > 0 and W ′
(
T
)
> 0 for 13(a− c)/(13 + 28θ) < s <
5(a− c)/(5 + 8θ). These observations provide us with Figures 1-3. Q.E.D.
Part of the underlying intuitions for Proposition 2 is well-recognized in the
trade literature. Market integration increases total supply in each country,
i.e., promotes competition, and thus favorably affects welfare (procompetitive
effect). In contrast, increased imports associated with reductions in transport
costs can have a negative welfare effect since the less efficient foreign firm’s
market share expands in each country.16 In addition to these effects, transport
cost reductions unambiguously expand both domestic and global pollution.
The overall welfare effect is determined by the interplay among these three
effects. If s is small enough, the pollution expansion effect is negligible and
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the result in trade theory is reestablished; welfare depends on T in a U-shaped
and T = 0 ensures higher welfare than autarky (Figure 1). This is because
‘aggregate trade costs are largest for intermediate values of’ T . (Haufler et
al., 2005, p. 292) Indeed, the total transport costs in the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium are calculated as
Ty = Tx∗ =
T [5(a− c)− 11T − s(5 + 8θ)]
24
,
which is inverted-U-shaped in T and becomes highest when T = [5(a− c)−
s(5 + 8θ)]/22. Accordingly, the above argument of Haufler et al. (2005)
survives our model even though we allow for pollution damages as long as s
is too small.
In contrast, the larger s is, the more significant the pollution expansion
effect is. This is illustrated in Case 2: autarky yields higher welfare than
trade with any non-prohibitive transport cost (Figure 2). The situation is
much worse if s is sufficiently large. In this case, reductions in transport costs
monotonically reduce welfare since pollution expansion and the associated
welfare losses are considerable. To summarize, the welfare effects of reduced
transport costs crucially depend on how the country cares about pollution
damages.
At this stage, it is useful to address the local pollution case in light of
comparison with some existing studies such as Walz and Wellisch (1997) and
Burguet and Sempere (2003) both of which focus on local pollution. In this
extreme case, we can state:
Corollary. When pollution is local, only Case 1 arises.
Proof: Under θ = 0, we have
W (0)
W (T )
=
121
112
W ′(0) = −13(a− c− s)
48
< 0, W ′(T ) =
31(a− c− s)
264
> 0,
which immediately leads to the result. Q.E.D.
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Both Walz and Wellisch (1997, Proposition 3, p. 284) and Burguet and
Sempere (2003), Proposition, p. 31) commonly prove that trade liberaliza-
tion is welfare-improving.17 While the above result is seemingly inconsistent
with their result, the reason is that we suppose transport costs as a trade bar-
rier. As mentioned earlier, freer trade is inevitably associated with wasteful
resources of transport costs. In contrast, this effect is absent in the gains-
from-trade proposition of Walz and Wellisch (1997) and Burguet and Sem-
pere (2003) because tariff revenue fully compensates the losses from wasteful
resources.
4 Concluding Remarks
Formulating a two-stage game model of strategic environmental and trade
policies, we have explored the effects of reductions in transport costs on
the equilibrium policies and welfare. The first result shows that market
integration induces each country to choose a lower emission tax and a higher
tariff. The second result identifies that whether freer trade benefits each
country highly depends on the degree of pollution damage.
Two advantages of this paper are that we endogenize both environmental
policies and trade policies and that we take into account transport costs. The
first point is relevant since trade policies as well as environmental policies are
available and are noncooperatively determined by self-interested governments
in light of reality. The second point is also important in view of the empirical
assessment of the literature cited in Introduction.
However, our results admittedly rest on a number of simplifying assump-
tions such as linear demand, cost and pollution damage. Although all of
these restrictions are frequently made to facilitate analysis in the existing
literature as well, it is important to reconsider the robustness of our results
by relaxing them. Furthermore, we assume away abatement activities. It is
our future research agenda to reexamine our results in more general settings.
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Notes
1. See Bagwell and Staiger (2003) for an excellent review of these newly
emerging issues surrounding world trade. Bhagwati (2004) also provides a
non-technical review of recent discussions of these issues.
2. Focusing on the perfectly competitive product markets, Copeland and
Taylor (2003) comprehensively survey the state-of-the-art of theoretical and
empirical researches on trade and the environment.
3. Employing a third-market (resp. reciprocal market) model, Walz and
Wellisch (1997) (resp. Burguet and Sempere (2003)) regard reductions in ex-
port subsidies (resp. import tariffs) as a scheme of trade liberalization. Both
papers commonly assume local pollution, but Baksi and Chaudhuri (2009)
allow for transboundary pollution.
4. Anderson and Wincoop (2004) also make clear the empirical significance
of reductions in transport costs.
5. Regarding this, Krugman (1995, p. 328) states that ‘international economists,
however, tend to view much, though not all, of the growth of trade as hav-
ing essentially political causes, seeing its great expansion after World War II
largely as a result of the removal of the protectionist measures · · ·.’
6. Kennedy (1994b), Walsh and Wellisch (1997) and Tanguay (2001) also
examine the interaction between environmental and trade policies, but their
focus substantially differs from ours.
7. See Brander (1981), Brander and Krugman (1983) and Helpman and
Krugman (1985, pp. 104-111) for the details of this model. Bernhofen (1998)
and Friberg and Ganslandt (2006) demonstrate that the Brander-Krugman
model provides an important insight empirically.
8. While it is possible to allow for different values of θ between countries,
our assumption that θ is internationally equal is plausible given the observa-
tion that environmental degradations are mostly global in the modern world,
namely, both countries suffer from the environmental damage equally.
9. The preference parameter a is assumed equal between countries. And, fol-
lowing the existing literature, we use an additively-separable utility function
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for convenience.
10. Instead of assuming a per-unit transport cost, Tanguay (2001) assumes
that profits from exporting are multiplied by k < 1, where k measures the
cost of exporting.
11. Thus, the assumption of market segmentation and positive values of y
and x∗ imply intra-industry trade in a homogeneous product. See, for in-
stance, Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983).
12. We follow Kennedy (1994a, b) and Haufler et al. (2005) in using these
terminologies.
13. This is confirmed in Haufler et al. (2005) and Straume (2006) as well.
14. Haufler et al. (2005) call this the rent shifting effect.
15. While Kennedy (1994b) assumes a production subsidy instead of an im-
port tariff as a protectionist instrument, most of his arguments apply to our
case with little modification. Looking at Eqs. (9.23) and (9.24) in Kennedy
(1994b, p. 206), we can confirm that emission taxes have four effects but
that production subsidies have three effects.
16. Note that untaxed marginal cost of domestic production is c while that
of exporting is c+ T . This intriguing result is first established by Lahiri and
Ono (1988).
17. Walz and Wellisch (1997) (resp. Burguet and Sempere (2003)) model
trade liberalization as a marginal reduction in export subsidies (resp. import
tariffs).
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Appendix
This appendix shows that welfare of each country has four components and
how each of them is affected by a reduction in transport costs. Under our
specification of the functions of utility, production cost, and pollution dam-
age, Home’s welfare is
V = a(x+ y)− (x+ y)
2
2
− p · (x+ y) + px+ p∗x∗ − c (x+ x∗)− τ (x+ x∗)− t∗x∗ − Tx∗
+τ (x+ x∗) + ty − sZ
= a(x+ y)− (x+ y)
2
2
+ (p∗ − t∗ − T )x∗ − (p− t)y − c (x+ x∗)− sZ
=
(2a− x− y)(x+ y)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
U
+ (p∗ − t∗ − T ) x∗ − (p− t)y︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
− c(x+ x∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
− sZ︸︷︷︸
D
≡ U + S − C −D, (16)
where U, S, C, and D respectively denote consumer utility, net trade sur-
plus, production cost, and environmental damage. Substituting (4)-(7) into
(16), each component becomes a function of emission taxes, tariffs, and the
transport cost:
U =
(4a+ 2c+ τ + τ ∗ + t+ t)[2(a− c)− τ − τ ∗ − t− T ]
18
(17)
S =
(a+ 2c+ τ + τ ∗ − 2t∗ − 2T )(a− c− 2τ + τ ∗ − 2t∗ − 2T )
9
−(a+ 2c+ τ + τ
∗ − 2t+ T )(a− c+ τ − 2τ ∗ − 2t− 2T )
9
(18)
C =
c[2(a− c)− 4τ + 2τ ∗ + t− 2t∗ − T ]
3
(19)
17
D =
s {2(a− c)− 4τ + 2τ ∗ + t− 2t∗ − T + θ[2(a− c) + 2τ − 4τ ∗ − 2t+ t∗ − T ]}
3
.
(20)
Differentiating (17)-(20) with respect to τ and t, we have
Uτ = Ut =
−a− 2c− τ − τ ∗ − t− T
9
(21)
Sτ =
−3a− 6c− 6τ + 4t+ 2t∗ + 3T
9
, St =
2(2a+ c+ 2τ − τ ∗ − 4t− T )
9
(22)
−Cτ = 4c
3
, −Ct = − c
3
(23)
−Dτ = 2s(2− θ)
3
, −Dt = −s(1− 2θ)
3
, (24)
where subscripts τ and t stand for a partial derivative. The emission tax and
tariff in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium are determined to aggregate
these effects, i.e., Uτ + Sτ − Cτ −Dτ = 0 and Ut + St − Ct −Dt = 0.
18
emission tax tariff
consumer utility UτT = −19 UtT = −19
net trade surplus SτT =
1
3
StT = −29
production cost −CτT = 0 −CtT = 0
environmental damage −DτT = 0 −DtT = 0
total ∂τN/∂T > 0 ∂tN/∂T < 0
Table 1: Effects of transport cost reductions on taxation
19
W (T )
T
O
W (0)
W (T )
T
Figure 1: Case 1
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Figure 3: Case 3
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